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By STEPHEN CALKINS*
THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION' ("AMC")
teed up for study two issues related to civil monetary remedies availa-
ble to the federal government:
1. Should DOJ and/or the FTC have statutory authority to impose
civil fines for substantive antitrust violations? If so, in what circum-
stances and what types of cases should such fines be available? If
DOJ and/or the FTC are given such authority[,] how[,] if at all,
should it affect the availability of damages awarded to private
plaintiffs?
2. Should Congress clarify[,] expand, or limit the FTC's authority
to seek monetary relief under 15 U.S.C. §53(b)? 2
This Article answers those questions and addresses more gener-
ally the role of federal civil monetary remedies in antitrust cases. Al-
though logic would seem to favor addressing the issues in order-and,
indeed, some arguments for civil fines also support the Federal Trade
Commission's ("FTC" or "Commission") use of 13(b) 3-the second
issue is so much easier and straightforward that this Article will ad-
* Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Wayne State University Law
School. The Author is a former General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission and
member of an ABA Section of Antitrust Law Task Force on the Antitrust Modernization
Commission, but writes exclusively on his own behalf. In preparing this Article, he
benefited from conversations with many lawyers in and outside the government. An earlier
version of this Article was presented in testimony to the Antitrust Modernization
Commission.
1. The AMC is described at its web site, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Home
Page, http://www.amc.gov/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2006); see also Stephen Calkins, Antitrust
Modernization: Looking Backwards, 41 J. CoRP. L. (forthcoming 2005); Albert A. Foer, Putting
the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective, 51 BuF. L. REv. 1029 (2003).
2. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Notice Requesting Public Comment, 70 Fed.
Reg. 28902, 28903, § I.E (May 19, 2005).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000). This Article will use "13(b)," the more familiar
reference.
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dress it first. The answer is a resounding "no." (The answer to the first
question is a tentative "perhaps.") Supporting both positions is the
reality that at least without appropriate use of 13(b), our current sys-
tem of antitrust remedies-even with its complicated and evolving
mix of criminal penalties, federal government injunctions, state en-
forcement, and private injunction and treble damages actions4-pro-
vides insufficient deterrence of selected categories of cases and creates
unfortunate incentives.
Section 13(b) is deceptively simple. It authorizes the Commission
to seek and courts to grant temporary restraining orders and prelimi-
nary injunctions to end or prevent violations of "any provision of law
enforced by the Federal Trade Commission" pending Commission ad-
ministrative adjudicatory procedures. 5 An initial proviso requires
prompt filing of an administrative complaint. A second proviso is at
the heart of the issue identified by the AMC: "Provided further, That in
proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, the
court may issue, a permanent injunction. '6 Courts have uniformly
held that "authority to grant such relief includes the power to grant
any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice, includ-
ing ordering equitable relief for consumer redress through the repay-
ment of money, restitution, rescission, or disgorgement of unjust
enrichment. ' 7 None of those courts was the Supreme Court, however,
4. See generally Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies' Bi-Mo-
dal Penalties, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1997); Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies
Revisited, 84 OR. L. REv. 147 (2005); Spencer Weber Waller, Private Law, Punishment, and
Disgorgement: The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KEN"T. L. REV. 207 (2003).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) reads:
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe-
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to
violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission,
and
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the
Commission and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set
aside by the court on review, or until the order of the Commission made
thereon has become final, would be in the interest of the public-
the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may
bring suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin any such act or prac-
tice. Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the
Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public
interest, and after notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction may be granted without bond ....
15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
6. Id.
7. FTC v. Ameridebt, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562 (D. Md. 2005); see, e.g., FTC v.
Freecom Commc'ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005); FTC v. Munoz, 2001-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,406 (9th Cir. 2001); FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir.
[Vol. 40
and very few of those cases were antitrust cases. Indeed, the Commis-
sion itself has recognized that it should proceed with special caution
in seeking monetary equitable relief in antitrust cases. 8 Hence the cur-
rent dispute.
This Article explores the issues involved in the current dispute
and sets out the proper role for government civil monetary antitrust
remedies. Part I argues that without the F-FC's ability to use section
13(b) to obtain such remedies, current antitrust remedies are insuffi-
cient because the system does not always work-and the system cre-
ates worrisome incentives. Part II sets out in detail the reasons why this
FTC authority should be preserved. It does this by reviewing the legis-
lation's language and history by explaining the importance of this au-
thority, its limited application, and the fallacies of the arguments
made against it. Part III concludes the Article by suggesting that seri-
ous consideration should be given to making monetary relief an op-
tion for selected civil cases filed by the United States Department of
Justice Antitrust Division ("Antitrust Division").
I. The Insufficiency of Current Antitrust Remedies
Federal government antitrust remedies continue to be largely "bi-
modal."9 Hard-core cartel behavior is punished with seemingly ever-
increasing severity by serious criminal penalties10 supplemented by
state and private damages actions. Unlawful mergers are enjoined in
their entirety, usually in advance of consummation. But almost all
other civil antitrust violations result in nothing more, as a federal gov-
ernment consequence, than a time-limited injunction.11 An occa-
sional injunction has serious consequences, such as dissolution; most
1997); FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (1lth Cir. 1996); FTC v. Pantron I
Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d
1312, 1316 (8th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 718 (5th Cir. 1982); see
also FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 1999).
8. FTC, Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases
(July 25, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/disgorgementfrn.htm [herein-
after FTC Policy Statement].
9. This concept is developed in Calkins, supra note 4, which complements the discus-
sion in this Section.
10. See Scott D. Hammond, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Criminal En-
forcement, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., An Overview of Recent Developments in
the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, Remarks Before the ABA Midwin-
ter Leadership Meeting (Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/207226.htm.
11. Antitrust Law Developments (Fifth), 1 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST 755-67 (2002) (DOJ
Remedies); id. at 653-73 (FTC Remedies).
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do not. This is unfortunate because the resulting bi-modal penalties
may provide insufficient deterrence and create worrisome incentives.
One can debate whether antitrust remedial consequences gener-
ally over-deter or under-deter. The Antitrust Division's international
cartel program suggests that at, least until fairly recently, there was
under-deterrence, and Professor Robert Lande energetically argues
that there continues to be under-deterrence even after recent in-
creases in penalties.1 2 Others disagree and worry about over-deter-
rence. 13 If antitrust violations are under-deterred across the board,
that would be an additional reason for preserving 13(b) and/or estab-
lishing civil penalties, but the argument for preserving 13(b) and/or
establishing civil penalties does not depend on any such conclusion,
so I leave the debate about general deterrence to others.
In truth, we have a strange system for punishing persons who
commit civil antitrust violations. In Europe the civil fine is the tool of
choice. 14 In the United States a federal government civil enforcement
action typically ends with an injunction, usually by consent, that pre-
vents future violations, and it is assumed that private and state dam-
ages actions will extract sufficient money from the wrongdoer to
compensate victims and adequately deter other violations. The gov-
ernment plays the role of the volleyball setter, leaving for others the
more glamorous (and lucrative) spiking. Although one might not re-
gard this as the model system were one starting afresh, it often works
reasonably well.1 5 Unfortunately, (a) the system does not always work,
and (b) it creates worrisome incentives.
A. The System Does Not Always Work
Optimal deterrence is not total deterrence, since the antitrust sys-
tem could deter every antitrust violation only by deterring substantial
amounts of lawful behavior. But recall that both deterrence and victim
12. See Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. (forth-
coming June 2006) (draft available from Author).
13. Michael L. Denger & D. Jarrett Arp, Criminal and Civil Cartel Victim Compensation:
Does Our Multifaceted Enforcement System Promote Sound Competition Policy?, 15 ANTIrRUST 41
(2001).
14. See Damien Geradin & David Henry, The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Com-
petition Law: An Empirical Review of the Commission Decisional Practice and the Commu-
nity Courts' Judgments (Global Competition Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 3/05, 2005),
available at http://www.kernbureau.uva.nl/acle/object.cfm/acfl2e3.pdPtobjectlD=03A55C
8D%2DCF84%2D459F%2DB4FFB394A70448C3&download=true.
15. See, e.g., David Balto, Returning to the Elman Vision of the Federal Trade Commission:
Reassessing the Approach to FTC Remedies, 72 ANTITRusT L.J. 1113, 1124-25 (2005) (examples
of system working). See generally Calkins, supra note 4.
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compensation depend substantially on effective follow-on litigation
that recovers sufficient money damages. There are important catego-
ries of cases where this does not happen for a variety of reasons. It has
long been known that, in the words of Professor Areeda, there are
"antitrust violations without damages recoveries."1 6 The requirements
that private plaintiffs surmount the rigorous hurdles of proving stand-
ing and antitrust injury17 (as well as the other elements of their cases),
when added to the commercial realities of business, make quite real
the possibility that an antitrust violation will go without private punish-
ment. As Assistant Attorney General Hewitt Pate observed, "The pros-
pect of injunctive relief alone may not be sufficient to deter or redress
violations of the antitrust laws .... -18 This Section will highlight physi-
cian agreements as a leading example of insufficient deterrence.
Almost two decades ago, the Justice Department, with considera-
ble fanfare, launched three serious healthcare grand jury proceed-
ings 19-only to suffer a stinging defeat in United States v. Alston.20
Shortly thereafter, the Antitrust Division entered into civil settlements
of the other two proceedings, 21 and since then the Division has filed
16. Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1127
(1976).
17. SeeJoseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers
for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. Prrr. L. REv. 437, 438-39 (2001).
18. Letter from R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Deborah A. Garza, Chair,
Antitrust Modernization Comm'n 2 (Jan. 5, 2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/com-
ments/pate.pdf [hereinafter Pate].
19. See Rule Outlines Investigations into Practices of Medical Profession, 55 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 965 (Dec. 8, 1988) (Assistant Attorney General Rule's speech to
American Medical Association "disclosed that the Antitrust Division is conducting several
grand jury investigations into allegations of anticompetitive behavior by members of the
medical profession."); see also 60 Minutes with Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Anti-
trust Division, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 393 (1989) (Rule on the reaction to his AMA speech:
"I have been, frankly, astonished at the sort of reaction I received.... For some reason,
they took it as a challenge to the entire profession, so maybe they are sending me a signal
that it [(criminality)] is more prevalent than I thought."). Rule's speech was greeted with
"tremendous surprise" and "made the front page of the New York Times." Health Care and
Competition, Law and Policy: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm 'n & the Dep't ofJustice, 53-54
(2003) (remarks of Kevin J. Grady), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/healthcarehear-
ings/031001ftctrans.pdf [hereinafter Health Care Hearings]. Although this was a new initia-
tive, it was not the first time the Antitrust Division had proceeded criminally against white
collar defendants. Cf United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979) (real estate
brokers).
20. 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,366 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 1990), affd, 974 F.2d 1206
(9th Cir. 1992).
21. Jack R. Bierig, Partner, Sidley Austin, LLP, Presentation to DOJ/FTC on Remedial
Issues in Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care 3 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/ogc/healthcarehearings/docs/031001jackbiering.pdf (discussing United States v.
Burgstiner, 56 Fed. Reg. 6681 (Feb. 19, 1991); see also 22 Obstetrician/Gynecologists in
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only one criminal case involving health-care providers. 22 As Kevin
Grady has observed, "IT]he Division made the strategy decision
that ... criminal prosecutions in the healthcare industry were more
pain than gain, and that prosecutorial resources could be better spent
elsewhere." 23 Whether that is a good thing I leave for others to de-
cide. 24 Government-sought remedies have usually been limited to a
"'go forth and sin no more' cease and desist order."25 But here, class
actions and other follow-on suits appear to be largely missing in ac-
tion. Physicians regularly file treble damages actions as plaintiffs who
are excluded from some medical facility, and they may find them-
selves as medical-facility-control-group defendants on the other side of
those cases, but private antitrust lawsuits virtually never follow-on gov-
ernment challenges to physician price fixing.26 It appears that the
Georgia Settle Division's Fee Exchange Accusations, 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
240 (Feb. 14, 1991) (case had been referred from FTC)); Toby G. Singer & Helen-Louise
Hunter, Criminal Investigation and Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws in the Health Care Field, 2
ANNALS HEALTH L. 67, 71-72 (1993) (also discussing United States v. Mass. Allergy Soc'y,
Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,846 (D. Mass. 1992) (consent decree)).
22. Complaint, United States v. Lake Country Optometry Soc'y, No. W-95-CR-114
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 1995); see also Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago's Procrustean Bed: Apply-
ing Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 892 n.148 (2004) (noting the
many threats to file criminal suits).
23. Health Care Hearings, supra note 19, at 54. The Division continues to claim that it
"is prepared to bring criminal prosecutions in healthcare where there is a blatant violation
of the antitrust laws and clear harm to consumers." Id. at 12-13 (remarks of DOJ's Gail
Kursh). Even supporters of increased criminal enforcement, however, caution that it
should be preceded by clear public announcements of the decision "to modify their unspo-
ken policy" or proceeding only civilly. See David Marx, Messenger Models: What Can the Agen-
cies Do to Prevent Provider Networks from Violating the Antitrust Laws?, HEALTH L. NEWS 24, 25
(Apr. 2005).
24. For the argument against substantially increased penalties against health care pro-
fessionals, see Bierig, supra note 21.
25. Marx, supra note 23, at 25; see also Greaney, supra note 22, at 893 ("Typically, the
government's consent orders have been wrist slaps, doing little more than enjoining future
misconduct-even in cases involving obvious cartel activities.") (footnote omitted).
26. See Marx, supra note 23, at 28. Even some people who suggest that treble damages
provide sufficient deterrence and that criminal enforcement is rarely necessary fail to pro-
vide much evidence of treble damages being imposed. See Bierig, supra note 21, at 8.
It is worth recalling that, in addition to government actions, private treble dam-
age actions are available. As you know, defendants who lose such actions get to
pay, not only treble damages, but also the plaintiffs' attorneys fees-even if only
injunctive relief is granted. There have been many such cases, e.g., Int'l. Healthcare
Mgmt. v. Hawaii Coalition for Health, 322 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2003), decided
just this year. There are plaintiffs' antitrust attorneys and class action attorneys
ready to move in if an arguable antitrust violation has occurred. Moreover, man-
aged care plans and others who feel that providers are acting anticompetitively
are not shy about threatening antitrust litigation. The threat of private treble




most logical payor-plaintiffs are loath to sue providers with whom they
desire a long-term mutually beneficial business relationship.
27
The inevitable result of this lack of deterrence is continued gov-
ernment antitrust actions. 28 Whether or not legal ambiguities or ag-
gressive promoters of various schemes contribute to the problem, and
even recognizing that respondents may agree to consent orders simply
to dispose of matters (without having done anything illegal), there is
something wrong when government agencies challenge very similar
behavior by responsible professionals year after year without achieving
effective deterrence. 29 As Professor Greaney has observed, "An epi-
demic of unvarnished cartelization schemes has surfaced and contin-
ued despite the numerous civil and administrative cases filed by the
federal agencies over the last twenty years." °30 FTC Chairman Majoras
has noted that the agency has "physician groups comprising some
20,000 physicians under order-by some estimates, that is 10 percent
of all doctors in the country." She wonders "why the message is not
Id.
Unfortunately for the strength of this position, the cited case affirmed the granting of a
defense motion for summary judgment on all claims, so although it proves that a private
treble damages case has been filed against, among others, a physicians group, it does not
prove that an action has been filed successfully.
27. Marx, supra note 23 ("Finally, it is most unusual for payors-who are the victims of
the anticompetitive conduct of provider networks-to pursue private actions against their
networks, and that is unlikely to change for the obvious reason that litigation would chill
any desire providers might have to contract with a payor on favorable terms in the fu-
ture."); Health Care Hearings, supra note 19, at 96 (remarks of Kevin Grady) ("[T]he payors
aren't going to have the chutzpah to go in and challenge the doctors that they need to
have in their networks later. That's just not going to happen.").
28. See Health Care and Competition, Law and Policy: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm'n
& the Dep't of Justice, 49 (2003) [hereinafter Singer Remarks] (remarks of Toby Singer)
("The core remedies have been the typical cease and desist, don't do it any more remedies,
with a little bit of fencing in .... And that, of course, didn't have much impact.").
29. Health Care Hearings, supra note 19, at 94 (remarks of Kevin Grady) ("I think, after
20 years of these consent orders and seeing the same types of activities, and the Agencies
coming down saying these are price-fixing, these are illegal activities, it's almost like
Groundhog Day. I mean, it just keeps repeating and repeating.").
30. Greaney, supra note 22, at 892 (noting that the FTC challenged fourteen instances
of physician price fixing in 2002-03 alone); see also Health Care Hearings, supra note 19, at
54, 57 (remarks of Kevin Grady) ("As a result of the lack of any criminal bite to violations
of the federal antitrust laws in the healthcare industry .... I believe that there's been a
definite decline in concern for the antitrust laws .... When the Agencies announce that
they've challenged or uncovered naked agreements to fix prices, but then resolve the
claims with a civil consent order that basically says 'Go and sin no more,' that creates the
impression within the healthcare industry that antitrust violations are a mere irritant.");
Marx, supra note 23, at 15 ("The Agencies' apparent abandonment of that [criminal] en-
forcement option over the past eight years may have caused provider networks to become
more brazen in their collective dealings with payors.").
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being heard and whether we can improve our effectiveness ... ,,31
The simple answer is that profitable illegal activities will continue un-
less they are adequately deterred, and government antitrust agencies
are not adequately deterring problematic physician behavior.
Although physician agreements may be the leading example of
insufficient deterrence, the problem is inherent in a system in which
government consequences leap from modest to massive, rather than
increasing in severity with the severity of the wrong-doing. Where pri-
vate and state suits fail to fill the gap, as inevitably will happen from
time to time, victims go uncompensated, and wrongful conduct goes
inadequately deterred.3 2
B. Worrisome Incentives
Without in any way suggesting any lack of good faith, one can
point out some troubling incentives created by the current system of
bi-modal federal sanctions.33 If the Antitrust Division or the FTC pro-
ceeds with a civil challenge to attempted or actual price fixing or mar-
ket division-and some such cases are challenged civilly 4-the
federal government remedy is likely to be limited to an injunction that
can be described, often with some justification, as an order not to do
it again. On the other hand, if the same conduct is successfully chal-
lenged criminally, it can be punished with prison time and massive
individual and corporate fines, as well as the image-shattering pros-
31. Deborah Platt Majoras, Reflections on My First Year, Remarks at the 2005 ABA
Annual Meeting 12 (Aug. 6, 2005) (citing five new orders entered in the past year), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050806abamtg.pdf.
32. For additional examples, see Calkins, supra note 4, at 149-53.
33. Examples of this problem are provided in Calkins, supra note 4, at 136-39.
34. See, e.g., Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). Compare
United States v. Mathworks, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4622 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2003) (con-
sent judgment entered), with Complaint at 33, United States v. Mathworks, Inc., 2003-1
Trade Cas. 1 73,794 (CCH) (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-888-A) (alleging "a per se illegal mar-
ket allocation and price-fixing agreement"), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f11300/11369.htm, and United States v. Village Voice Media, LLC, 2003-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 74,061 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2003), 2003 WL 21659092 (consent order), with Com-
plaint at 48, United States v. Village Voice Media, LLC, 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,061
(N.D. Ohio 2003) (No. 1:03CV0164), 2003 WL 22019521 (alleging per se illegal "horizon-
tal market and customer allocation agreement designed to eliminate competition" that
resulted in rate hikes). In FTC v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co. III, Ltd., the FTC filed a civil
challenge to what Chairman Majoras described as "a naked agreement not to compete and
to share the resulting profits between a branded drug seller and its only prospective ge-
neric competitor." Complaint, FTC v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co. Ill, Ltd., (D.D.C. Nov.
7, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0410034/051107comp0410034%20.
pdf; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Sues to Stop Anticompetitive Agreement in
U.S. Drug Industry (Nov. 7, 2005).
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pect of a felony conviction. The striking disconnect between those two
outcomes creates an incentive to favor criminal enforcement. When
criminal antitrust investigations are initiated, the choice is often be-
tween filing an indictment and taking no action.
The lack of attraction to proceeding civilly is born out by the
numbers. During the five years starting in 2000, the Division has filed
an average of only 2.4 civil nonmerger cases a year, compared to 44.6
criminal cases.3 5 When in the late 1980's the Antitrust Division de-
cided to increase the seriousness with which antitrust was taken by
physicians, it leapt right to criminal enforcement, which was ulti-
mately unsuccessful. 36 Earlier that same decade a previous administra-
tion sent its own signal about the seriousness of antitrust when it
decided controversially "to be remembered for bringing the first crim-
inal felony resale price maintenance case." 37 In both situations, had
an alternative, mid-level remedy been available, it might have been
wiser to have tried that first.
The two federal antitrust agencies' general lack of financial pen-
alty creates another unfortunate incentive. It is human nature to want
to punish a wrongdoer. 38 When the wrongdoer has posed a substantial
challenge, say, by resisting the government, the temptation is all the
stronger. How satisfying can it be to work long hours litigating against,
well, lawyers, when the "prize" for winning is the right to impose a
wrist-slap, telling the wrongdoer to behave next time? Nor can an en-
forcement agency consider itself successful if unlawful behavior is not
deterred. 39 To be sure, injunctions legally may not be punitive 40-but
it has to be tempting to make them punitive. Orders are regularly
justified as imposing various obligations in order to prevent future vio-
35. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics FY 1995-2004, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.htm.
36. See generally supra note 19 and accompanying text.
37. Margaret B. Carlson, Discounters Decry Easing of Antitrust Enforcement, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 12, 1982, at 6; see also United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc., [U.S. Antitrust Case Summaries
1980-1988] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 53,436-37 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 1980) (accepting nolo
contendere plea and ordering $250,000 fine in criminal resale price maintenance case).
38. Cf Health Care and Competition, Law and Policy: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm'n
& the Dep't of Justice, 122 (2003) [hereinafter Kursh Remarks] (remarks of Gail Kursh,
Dep't ofJustice) ("Even though we may want to punish or we think a little bit more would
deter someone else there, we have to circumscribe our relief for the legitimate
purpose.. ").
39. Cf Majoras, supra note 31 (wondering "why the message is not being heard and
whether we can improve our effectiveness").
40. See, e.g., Kursh Remarks, supra note 38, at 5 ("The only legitimate goal of a civil
antitrust remedy.., is to restore competition to the marketplace. Thus, the remedy must
not be punitive. That's the job for criminal enforcement.").
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lations, yet, speaking frankly, who is less likely to violate some clear
antitrust rule than a firm just found liable for doing so, at least if that
finding of liability had some serious consequence? Although govern-
ment lawyers crafting decrees attempt to work honorably with blinders
keeping them focused on proper issues, it must be difficult to resist an
occasional glance at issues of punishment or deterrence. 4'
Terms in an order that are more onerous than needed punish
not only the defendant/respondent, but also the general public,
which suffers when resources are wasted on unimportant compliance
and especially when procompetitive activities are foregone because of
such an unduly stringent order. To be sure, the antitrust agencies are
aware of this problem and attempt to minimize it;42 yet it remains a
problem in Sherman Act section 2 cases, which allege monopolization
or attempted monopolization. During the Microsoft saga, the list-
servers saw a number of commentators wishing that the antitrust sys-
tem could simply impose a massive fine and then set Microsoft on its
way, free to compete vigorously, but fully aware that any misstep could
bring further litigation and penalties. 43 That option was simply un-
available in our system. 44 Where behavior is lawful in some contexts
but not in others, as is typical for section 2 cases, it is very hard to write
a good conduct order.
The above review of the insufficiency of current government anti-
trust remedies was made with one qualification: the FTC has, on rare
occasion, supplemented other remedies by obtaining monetary equi-
table relief. That authority should be preserved.
41. Cf, e.g., Singer Remarks, supra note 28, at 49 (Because the standard health care
consent order "didn't have much impact... more recently, there have been other reme-
dies that are introduced into these orders that at least in some cases may have an effect on
the particular market in which the physicians have been accused of wrongdoing, even if
not more broadly. .. ").
42. See, e.g., Kursh Remarks, supra note 38, at 6 ("[W]e know that remedies can have
unintended effects in the marketplace. So it's our job to try to predict such effects or
consequences to the extent we can, and avoid them if that's possible.").
43. Cf., e.g., Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network
Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 97 (2001) ("The shortcomings inherent in the various
injunctive remedies proposed in the Microsoft case counsel one to reconsider seriously the
efficacy and feasibility of monetary remedies."); Neil R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein,
Microsoft-Remedies in Monopoly Cases, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 15, 2000, at 3 (reviewing problems with
behavioral and structural remedies).
44. It was an option in Europe, but enforcers there chose to impose both a C497
million fine and conduct provisions. Press Release, European Comm'n, Commission Con-
cludes on Microsoft Investigation, Imposes Conduct Remedies and a Fine (Mar. 24, 2004),
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/382&
format=HTML&aged= I&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
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II. Congress Should Not Change the FTC's 13(b) Authority
Addressing both whether to increase DOJ's authority to seek
monetary equitable relief or civil fines and whether FTC monetary eq-
uitable relief authority should be clarified, the AMC's Civil Procedure
and Remedies Working Group ("Working Group") wrote that
"[t] here is general agreement that the agencies have made considera-
ble efforts recently to address these issues and that they are not a high
priority for additional reform efforts."45 At least with respect to FTC
monetary equitable relief, the Working Group was correct although it
later abandoned its own recommendation. 46 This is an issue that
should be left alone.
One reason to leave it alone is because the courts are fully
equipped to deal with the issue. As noted above, it is settled law that
section 13(b) authorizes monetary equitable relief.47 If, however, the
critics are right and 13(b) does not authorize monetary equitable re-
lief,48 no congressional action is needed because the courts will take
care of the matter. Plenty of 13(b) cases are litigated every year, so
there is ample opportunity for courts to correct any misreading. De-
fendants are fully capable of pointing to any possible Commission
abuses when making their cases in court.
There is more to the argument for congressional inaction than
merely the suggestion to defer to courts. In particular, other justifica-
tions include: (1) the language and history of 13(b) support applying
monetary equitable relief in competition cases and not merely con-
sumer protection cases, and to award permanent injunctions; (2)
45. Memorandum from Civil Procedure and Remedies Working Group to All Com-
missioners 14 (Dec. 21, 2004), available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/CivilProce-
dure.pdf.
46. After the Working Group submitted its report, it received a letter from Assistant
Attorney General Hew Pate that recommended studying whether to endorse federal gov-
ernment civil fine authority. Pate, supra note 18, at 2. Several members of the Working
Group reacted by deciding that it was preferable to review private remedies in the context
of government remedies. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Transcript of Meeting 99 (Jan.
13, 2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/transcript050113.pdf. The ini-
tial list of issues selected for study included the issue recommended for rejection, "Should
government civil remedies be expanded, restricted, or clarified?," Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n, Issues Selected for Study, available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/study.
issues.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
47. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
48. See Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act:
Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1139 (1992); IvyJohnson, Resti-
tution on BehaIf of Indirect Purchasers: Opening the Backdoor to Illinois Brick, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1005 (2000); Michael S. Kelly, In Seeking Dollars from Drug Concerns, FTC Oversteps
Bounds of Law, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at S34.
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monetary equitable relief plays a critical role in consumer protection
cases, and preserving that role while abolishing its use in antitrust
cases would be problematic; (3) it potentially plays an important role
in selected antitrust cases; (4) the FTC's monetary equitable relief pol-
icy for competition cases is extremely limited; and (5) the arguments
typically made to support change are unpersuasive. As noted above,
the argument does not depend on a belief that even when the antitrust
system's full array of penalties-corporate criminal fines, individual
fines and incarceration, private treble damages, parens patriae actions,
and state actions-are brought to bear, inadequate deterrence is
achieved. If that is true, it provides an additional argument for pre-
serving 13(b), but there is a compelling case regardless.49
A. Section 13(b)'s Language and History Support Its Application in
Competition Cases and Awarding Permanent Injunctions
Critics of the FTC obtaining monetary equitable relief in antitrust
cases have suggested that this power is really a consumer protection
power.50 Nothing could be further from the truth. Nor is it fair to
49. This Article's argument for preserving 13(b) also does not depend on any sugges-
tion that monetary equitable relief might be important in cases reachable only to the ex-
tent that section 5 extends beyond the antitrust laws. See AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS
OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE WORKING GROUP ON REMEDIES 14 (2005), available
at http://www.amc.gov/public-studies-fr28902/remediespdf/AAIRemedies.pdf [here-
inafter AAI REMEDIES COMMENT] ("In addition, the FTC Act is broader than the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act, and disgorgement actions can, at least in theory, assure some level
of deterrence in a wider range of cases.").
50. In addition to calling for limiting part of the reach of 13(b) to consumer protec-
tion cases, critics have argued more broadly that even if it once seemed permissible to read
section 13(b) broadly, more recent Supreme Court teaching has shown the error of this
approach. See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1995); United States v. Phil-
lip Morris USA Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (disgorgement unavailable under
RICO). It would be a remarkable reversal were the Court to change the basic approach to
finding implied remedies that has been at the core of powers enjoyed by the FTC, the SEC,
and other governmental agencies. See 2 FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at
9-113 (A.A. Sommer, Jr., ed., 2005) ("Although the federal securities statutes do not grant
the Commission express statutory authority to obtain disgorgement from defendants in
injunctive actions, courts have long held that they may, in the exercise of their equitable
powers, order the disgorgement of profits or losses avoided as a result of conduct in viola-
tion of the federal securities laws."); 8 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 3775-83 (3d ed. 2004) (disgorgement authority long implied in SEC cases); 10 id. at
4713-23 (ancillary relief); see also Eric M. Blumberg, Universal Management, Abbott, Wyeth,
Schering-Plough, and... :Restitution and Disgorgement Find Another Home at the Food and Drug
Administration, 58 FooD & DRUG L.J. 169 (2003) (reviewing FDA's use of equitable author-
ity in three consent decrees and one successfully litigated case). Meghrig need not and
probably should not be read that broadly. See United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d
219, 220 (3d Cir. 2005) (FDA impliedly authorized to seek restitution). That particular
legal dispute, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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suggest that Congress really intended to give the Commission the
power to seek only preliminary injunctions. In section 13(b), Con-
gress gave the Commission "broad, new injunctive authority. 51
It is a real stretch to try to limit 13(b) to consumer protection
cases. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act 52 was passed in response to one
of America's recurrent energy crises. 53 Section 408 (the section in
question) declared that its purpose was to help the FTC "avoid unfair
competitive practices" 54-not deceptive practices, but "competitive"
practices. This provision was introduced as an amendment on the Sen-
ate floor by Senator Henry Jackson, so no regular committee report
illuminates the meaning of the words, but Senator Jackson boldly de-
clared the purpose of his amendment, which would give the FTC "ma-
jor new statutory authority":55 "Mr. President, the purpose of the
amendment I am introducing today is to grant the Federal Trade
Commission the full range of powers and legal authority it needs to
both identify and prevent unfair methods of competition and an-
ticompetitive conduct."56 Similarly, what little debate there was re-
ferred more frequently to antitrust than to consumer protection
concerns.
57
51. Introduction: Antitrust Amendments of 1973, in 6 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATES 4949 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1983) (nicely
chronicling the legislative history).
52. Trans-Alaska Authorization Pipeline Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584 (1973)
(amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-46, 53, 56).
53. As the FTC Chairman wrote to a member of the Conference Committee:
[T]he occasion for incorporating these provisions in the present legislation was
the realization by yourself and other Members of Congress, at the time of the
acute gasoline shortage last spring, that because it lacked the authority to seek
preliminary injunctions the Commission would have been completely powerless
to aid the small gasoline retailer, distributor, or refiner, even assuming there had
been proof of the most blatant anticompetitive behavior by their major
competitors.
119 CONG. REc. 36,610 (1973) (quoted in remarks of Rep. Johnson).
54. Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. IV, § 408(b), 87 Star. 591 (1973).
55. 119 CONG. REc. 22,797 (1973) (statement of Sen.Jackson); see also 119 CONG. REC.
21,443 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson) (identical language).
56. 119 CONG. REC. 22,979 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson). Senator Jackson used
identical words when he introduced the same amendment to a different bill fifteen days
earlier. 119 CONG. REc. 21,443 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson). SenatorJackson noted
that the FTC's General Counsel had complained that other proposed legislation would
have authorized injunctions only against "'deceptive practices,'" whereas the General
Counsel believed the authority should not be so limited. 119 CONG. REc. 22,979 (1973)
(statement of Sen. Jackson) (quoting June 15, 1973 letter from Ronald M. Dietrich); see
also 119 CONG. REc. 21,443 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson) (identical wording).
57. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REc. 36,612 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Dingell) (lauding the
"antitrust enforcement efforts of the Commission"); 119 CONG. REc. 36,597 (1973) (re-
marks of Rep. Melcher) ("remove the roadblocks to quick adjudication of antitrust viola-
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Some confusion has resulted from the failure of Senator Jackson
and other proponents of the amendment to discuss the kind of
"proper cases" for the Commission to seek permanent injunctions. Al-
though Senator Jackson justified proceeding by floor amendment be-
cause "similar authority was passed by the Senate in the last Congress
as part of the [proposed] Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, ' '58 the refer-
enced bill did not include the permanent injunction proviso that is
the source of the Commission's equitable authority. 59 That proviso
was also missing from the bill that Senators Magnuson and Moss intro-
duced in January 1973;60 it appeared for the first time in the bill re-
ported out four months later.6 1 The accompanying Report's entire
discussion of the change is as follows:
Provision is also made in section 210 for the Commission to seek
and, after a hearing, for a court to grant a permanent injunction.
This will allow the Commission to seek a permanent injunction
when a court is reluctant to grant a temporary injunction because
it cannot be assured of a[n] early hearing on the merits. Since a
permanent injunction could only be granted after such a hearing,
this will assure the court of the ability to set a definite hearing date.
Furthermore, the Commission will have the ability, in the routine fraud
case, to merely seek a permanent injunction in those situations in which it
does not desire to further expand upon the prohibitions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act through the issuance of a cease-and-desist order. Commis-
sion resources will be better utilized, and cases can be disposed of
more efficiently.62
tions"); cf. 119 CONG. REc. 36,614 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Rodino) (FTC needs these
powers "to protect the public from antitrust violations and economic deceptive prac-
tices."); 119 CONG. R.Ec. 36,605 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Evins) ("I have introduced [simi-
lar] legislation to strengthen the powers of the Federal Trade Commission in its efforts to
curb false and deceptive trade practices."); 119 CONG. REc. 36,605 (1973) (remarks of Rep.
Smith) (referring to both "anticompetitive and anticonsumer practices").
58. 119 CONG. REc. 21,443 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson).
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000); see also supra note 7; S. 986, 92d Cong. § 210 (1971),
as reported in S. REP. No. 92-269, at 41 (1971); id. at 28-29 (section analysis). That bill
expressly authorized the Commission to seek consumer redress after entry of a Commis-
sion cease and desist order. S. 986 § 203; see also S. REP. No. 92-269, at 24-25 (section
analysis); id. at 5 (quoting ABA report on the importance of "'some form of private relief
for or on behalf of consumers"' and noting that FTC Chairman Weinberger had requested
"authority to award damages to consumers injured by acts of practices found by the Com-
mission to violate the law"). The bills reported out in the two preceding Congresses also
would have authorized the seeking only of preliminary injunctions. S. 3201, 91st Cong.
§ 102 (1970), as reported in S. REP. No. 91-1124, at 21 (1970) (also providing for consumer
redress); S. REP. No. 90-1311, at 15 (1968) (accompanying S. 3065).
60. S. 356, 93d Cong. § 210 (as introduced, Jan. 12, 1973).
61. S. REP. No. 93-151, at 28 (as reported by S. Comm. on Commerce, May 14, 1973).
62. Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
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The reference to "the routine fraud case" makes sense only when
one remembers that the reported bill, like all the predecessor bills,
would have authorized injunctions only against "unfair or deceptive"
acts or practices. The more generic explanation is the one with some
applicability to "unfair methods of competition" antitrust cases: the
Commission may seek a permanent injunction "in those situations in
which it does not desire to further expand upon the prohibitions of
the Federal Trade Commission Act through the issuance of a cease
and desist order" because by this it means "Commission resources will
be better utilized, and cases can be disposed of more efficiently. '63
This explication is just as applicable to appropriate antitrust as to ap-
propriate consumer protection cases.
Critics of the use of monetary equitable relief emphasize the ex-
tent to which Congress thought about section 13(b) as authorizing the
use of preliminary injunctions. As one analysis argues, "Congress de-
signed this legislation to eliminate the long-recognized deficiency in
FTC enforcement power that allowed respondents to carry on their
activities until FTC issuance of a final cease and desist order .... "64 In
truth, the FTC requests for congressional assistance did emphasize
preliminary injunction authority.65 At least one member of Congress
also emphasized this authority.66
Even were such emphasis widespread, it could not override the
words of the legislation, which explicitly authorize the use of perma-
nent injunctions. 67 But, if it mattered, there is every reason to believe
that Congress knew what it was doing. When he introduced his
amendment, Senator Jackson referred sweepingly to giving the FTC
"the full range of powers and legal authority it needs to both identify
and prevent unfair methods of competition and anticompetitive con-
63. Id. at 31.
64. Ward, supra note 48, at 1175. But cf id. at 1178 (reluctantly acknowledging the
permanent injunction proviso).
65. 119 CONG. Rrc. 21,435 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson) (quotingJune 15, 1973
letter from FTC General Counsel Ronald M. Dietrich requesting the power "to seek such
preliminary injunctions"); see also Letter from Lewis A. Engman, Chairman, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, to Rep. Harold T. Johnson, House of Representatives (Nov. 9, 1973) (describing
the bill as authorizing the Commission "to seek temporary injunctions"), as reprinted in 119
CONG. REc. 36,610 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Johnson).
66. 119 CONG. REc. 36,609 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Smith) ("It is only good sense that
where there is a probability that the act will eventually be found illegal and the perpetrator
ordered to cease, that some method be available to protect innocent third parties while the
litigation winds its way through final decision.").
67. 15 U.S.C. 53(a) (2000).
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duct."68 A formal analysis of the amendment by one of the House
managers accurately explained that the bill "would authorize the
Commission to seek temporary or permanent restraints of imminent
or actual violations of the laws under its enforcement cognizance."69
The Report of the Conference Committee was more vague, saying that
the legislation "gave the Commission broader authority to initiate in-
junction actions,"70 and most Members were similarly imprecise 7 1 -
but wholly consistent with the ordinary meaning of the words enacted
into law.
The strongest legislative-history-based argument of critics of mon-
etary equitable relief is that shortly after enacting section 13(b), Con-
gress passed the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act 72 that, among other things, added section 19 to the
frC Act.7 3 Section 19 authorizes the Commission to seek consumer
redress in specified categories of cases.74 Indeed, one can trace both
the Commission's section 13(b) authority to seek injunctions and its
section 19 redress authority (at least after entry of final cease and de-
68. 119 CONG. REc. 22,979 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson); 119 CONG. REC. 21,
443 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson) (introducing same amendment to a different bill).
SenatorJackson was not entirely consistent. After the conference report had been agreed
to, he printed in the record a letter he and two other Senators had sent to President Nixon
urging him to support the legislation in the face of lobbying focused on two provisions, on
of which, they said, would "grant modest but much-needed new authority to the Federal
Trade Commission to enable it to enforce more efficiently the laws under its jurisdiction."
Letter from Senators Jackson, Melcher & Gravel to Richard M. Nixon, President of United
States (Nov. 9, 1973), as reprinted at 145 CONG. REc. 36,809 (1973).
69. 119 CONG. REc. 36,610 (1973) (remarks of Rep.Johnson) (adding that the legisla-
tion "would provide the Commission with comparable authority to that already possessed
by the Attorney General in antitrust cases"); see also 119 CONG. REc. 23,620 (1973) (remarks
of Sen. Hart) (describing the just-Senate-passed amendment as giving the FTC "the power
to seek preliminary and permanent injunctions where necessary").
70. H.R. REP. No. 93-624, at 23 (1973) (Conf. Rep.).
71. 119 CONG. REC. 36,597 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Melcher) (important to "remove
the roadblocks to quick adjudication of antitrust violations"); 119 CONG. REc. 36,606
(1973) (remarks of Rep. Udall) ("The FTC will have subpena (sic) and injunctive power
and be able to initiate, prosecute, and appeal violations of the Federal trade laws.").
72. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 59 (2000).
74. See Ward, supra note 48, at 1179-84; Johnson, supra note 48, at 1014; Michael N.
Sohn & William J. Baer, Injunctions Emerge as FTC's Powerful New Weapon, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
22, 1982, at 14 ("If Congress had already authorized the FTC to seek redress for fraud
when it enacted §13(b) in 1973, why was it necessary in 1975 to enact §19(a)(2), which
specifically provides for similar relief, but only after an administrative proceeding?");
Michael S. Kelly & Bilal Sayyed, FTC's Quest for Money Damages: An Unauthorized Power Grab,
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), June 11, 1999 (Section 19
"would be entirely unnecessary if the FTC's current reading of Section 13(b) is correct.").
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sist orders) to the same bill.7 5 Although one could reconcile that bill's
implicit provision for monetary equitable relief (in cases not deserving
administrative adjudication) and its explicit provision for consumer
redress after an administrative adjudicated order became final, the
relevant Committee report makes no such explication. 76 Nor does the
Conference Report on the Magnuson-Moss bill suggest that Congress
contemplated that section 13(b) could be used to obtain equitable
monetary relief.77 This Report was issued a year after section 13(b)
had become law and explained a decision to provide for consumer
redress, as had the Senate but not the House.
It would be a mistake to make too much of this, however. Section
19 explicitly declares that the "[r] emedies provided in this section are
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action
provided by State or Federal law. Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to affect any authority of the Commission under any other pro-
vision of law."'78 Although the Conference Report makes reference to
a specific dispute about the Commission's authority to seek redress,79
the words of the statute are sweeping. The failure of Congress to set
out a full analysis of the intersection between section 13(b) and sec-
tion 19 is unsurprising, since the Senate Committee Report was issued
75. S. REP. No. 93-151, at 42-44 (1973) (court redress actions authorized following
the entering of certain final cease and desist orders).
76. See S. REP. No. 93-151 (1973).
77. H.R. REP. No. 93-1606, at 40-42 (1974) (Conf. Rep.); see also H.R. Rep. No. 93-
1107, at 87-88 (1974) (separate views of Rep. Broyhill et al.) (explaining House decision to
strike consumer redress provision from bill); cf Lewis A. Engman, Report from the Federal
Trade Commission, 44 ANTiTRTus L.J. 161, 164 (1975) (FTC chairman explaining that the
1975 Magnuson-Moss Act "created a wholly new approach" to consumer redress that is
.capable of tremendous flexibility").
78. 15 U.S.C. § 57(b).
79. The House Report noted:
The authority of the Commission to seek consumer redress encompassed by the
Conference substitute deals exclusively with civil actions brought by the Commis-
sion and relief granted by the courts in those actions. The section is intended to
supplement the ability of the Commission to redress consumer and other injury
resulting from violations of its rules or of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act and is not intended to modify or limit any existing power the Com-
mission may have to itself issue orders designed [for] remedying violations of the
law. That issue is now before the courts. It is not the intent of the Conferees to
influence the outcome in any way.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1606, at 42 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974), held that section 5(b) of the FTC Act did
not authorize the Commission to award restitution to injured consumers, but the Commis-
sion has consistently asserted its disagreement with Heater. E.g., Elec. Computer Program-
ming Inst., 86 F.T.C. 1093, 1095 (1975).
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before Senator Jackson even proposed section 13(b),80 and the bill
reported by the House did not include language explicitly authorizing
redress.81 That Senate Report did accompany a bill that provided both
for preliminary and permanent injunctions and explicitly for con-
sumer redress, but for redress only after entry of a final administrative
cease and desist order (such that there was no tension between the
provisions),82 The Senate Report, although somewhat less sweeping
than the statute as enacted, made clear that the new redress authority
would supplement other powers.8 3 Nothing in the wording or history
of section 19 undoes what Congress accomplished in section 13(b)
when it gave the Commission "the full range of powers and legal au-
thority to both identify and prevent unfair methods of competition
and anticompetitive conduct."8 4 It is clear, therefore, that section
13(b)'s language and history support its application to award perma-
nent injunctions, and presumably ancillary equitable relief, in compe-
tition as well as consumer protection cases.
B. Section 13(b)'s Critical Role in Consumer Protection Cases
The original vision of the FTC called for a group of experts to
deliberate about business practices and advise well-intended business
80. See generally S. REP. No. 93-151 (1973).
81. H.R. REP. No. 93-1107 (1974).
82. S. 356, 93d Cong. § 203 (as reported by S. Comm. on Commerce, May 14, 1973).
83. The Senate Report stated:
This section would not affect whatever power the Commission may have under
section 5 of the FTC Act to fashion relief in its initial cease-and-desist order, such
as corrective advertising or any other remedy, which may be appropriate to termi-
nate effectively unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Likewise, there is no intent
on the part of the Committee to disturb the Commission's power to compel resti-
tution by its own order when such restitution is necessary to terminate a continu-
ing violation of section 5 .... Section 203 is applicable to those situations where
the Commission acts to make specific consumers whole and is not intended to
supplant general actions by the Commission which are designed to dissipate the
prior effects of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
S. REP. No. 93-151, at 28 (1973).
84. 119 CONG. REc. 22,979 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jackson); see also Introduction,
supra note 51, at 4949 (Commission was given "broad, new injunctive authority").
If one were to rely on subsequent congressional action to interpret section 13(b), one
should also note evidence of subsequent congressional approval of the FTC's use 13(b) to
obtain monetary equitable relief. See S. REP. No. 103-130, at 15-16 (1994), as reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N 1776, 1790-91 ("Section 13 of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to file
suit to enjoin any violation of the FTC [Act]. The FTC can go into court ex parte to obtain
an order freezing assets, and is also able to obtain consumer redress.... The FTC has used
its section 13(b) injunction authority to counteract consumer fraud, and the Committee
believes that the expansion of venue and service of process in the reported bill should
assist the FTC in its overall efforts.").
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leaders about what practices were "unfair."8 5 The Commission would
determine that this or that method of competition was "unfair" and
direct a respondent to cease engaging in it.86 Although the Commis-
sion could issue an order against a particular firm found to have been
"unfair," there was a sense that once business leaders knew that a prac-
tice was considered "unfair," they would refrain from engaging in it.
This genteel vision, if ever valid, proved singularly inapplicable to
fraud artists, against whom the FIC started a major push during the
1980s.8 7 Gradually the Commission developed the section 13(b)-based
tools needed to accomplish its anti-fraud mission.88 Today, the heart
of the FTC's consumer protection mission is using section 13(b) to
combat fraud by obtaining equitable relief-temporary restraining or-
ders, preliminary injunctions, permanent injunctions, and monetary
equitable relief.8 9 Although section 13(b)'s origins lie in the world of
antitrust, its dominant use has been against fraud.
Presumably the AMC is not seriously considering interfering with
the heart of the EIC's consumer protection mission; after all, the
AMC's mandate is limited to antitrust. Yet the same section 13(b) ap-
plies to all of the FTC's core jurisdiction, consumer protection, and
competition alike; the question posed by the AMC asks whether Con-
85. A.B.A., REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION 6 (1969) ("To provide businessmen with a forum for evaluating the great variety of
fact situations likely to arise ... Congress created an administrative agency to implement
the new statutes. The agency was designed to combine a number of features not available
to the Department of Justice, including extensive fact-finding powers, special expertise in
economic matters, and business advisory procedures.").
86. Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Com-
petition, 71 ANTIrrRUST L.J. 1, 62-68 (2003).
87. See Miles W. Kirkpatrick et al., Report of the American Bar Association Section of Anti-
trust Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
43, 53 (1989).
88. See Calkins, supra note 4, at 133-36; David M. FitzGerald, Presentation at the Fed-
eral Trade Commission 90th Anniversary Symposium: The Genesis of Consumer Protec-
tion Remedies Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act (Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/docs/fitzgeraldremedies.pdf; David R. Spiegel, History and Develop-
ment of the FTC's 13(b) Fraud Program, in I ANTITRUST 43 (2004).
89. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks to the Con-
sumer Federation of America Consumer Assembly 3 (Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050311faw.pdf ("Aggressive law enforcement is the main-
stay of the FTC's consumer protection mission. [In the past year,] the FTC has filed 83
actions in federal district court, and obtained 75 judgments ordering the return of more
than $474 million in consumer redress to consumers."). Although the Commission regu-
larly uses 13(b) to obtain monetary equitable relief, it occasionally uses that authority to
obtain a permanent injunction without monetary relief. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Court Order Bars Deceptive Investment Pitches (May 17, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/05/britishcapital.htm (describing stipulated court order).
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gress should change section 13(b)-not section 13(b) as applied to
antitrust cases. Nor would anyone likely want to ban most of section
13(b) in antitrust cases, since this is the authority for enjoining unlaw-
ful mergers, which is near-universally seen as a core Commission func-
tion. Presumably the question is whether section 13(b) should be
revised so that its permanent injunction proviso does not apply, or
applies only in limited ways, to "unfair methods of competition" cases
seeking monetary equitable relief. Yet competition and consumer pro-
tection law are "two wings of the same house."90 They share a com-
mon origin; they have a common objective in the protection of
consumers; indeed, to the extent they are associated with separate
parts of section 5-"unfair methods of competition" and "unfair and
deceptive acts or practices"-they share the common word "unfair."
Every so often, an investigation in one part of the Commission's
house raises issues in the other. Mischief could potentially follow from
any effort to specify that some particular remedy is available for use
against an "unfair or deceptive act" but not against an "unfair method
of competition." It is one thing for the Commission to treat its two
missions differently as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. It would be
another thing to give a defendant a statutory right to object to a rem-
edy if the Commission filed what the respondent claimed was "really"
a competition matter.91 Follow-on litigation may fail to play its salutary
role for several reasons: (1) because procedural problems or standing
issues prevent recovery, (2) because persons with good causes of ac-
tion are loath to sue for one reason or another, (3) because recoveries
are too small to be worth pursuing, or (4) likely for other reasons.92
The FTC's participation may facilitate a global, national settlement.93
Alternatively, private settlements for sub-optimal amounts may result
90. Thomas B. Leary, Competition Law and Consumer Protection Law: Two Wings of the
Same House, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1147 (2005).
91. Any effort at statutory drafting would confront the reality that section 13(b) ap-
plies to all of the law enforced by the FTC, but also that the FTC is only one of the federal
agencies using this kind of equitable authority. The SEC is the best known of these agen-
cies, but not the only one. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
92. See Government Civil Remedies: Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, 5-6
(2005) (statement of John Graubert, Principal Deputy Gen. Counsel, Fed. Trade
Comm'n), available at http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/GraubertState-
ment.pdf.
93. See Kevin J. O'Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, 15 ANTITRUsT 34, 37
(2001) ("Even though only thirty-three states were party plaintiffs in the Mylan matter, the
fact that the FTC had obtained a disgorgement remedy supported a national distribution
of a significant portion of the settlement funds to all overcharged consumers, including
those who resided in states with no apparent indirect purchaser right of action, in effect
nationalizing the settlement.").
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in insufficient deterrence and inadequate compensation. Although no
one is suggesting that the FTC needs to be filing large numbers of
these actions,9 4 the apparent failure of deterrence with respect to phy-
sicians serves as a reminder that without monetary equitable relief,
there are classes of cases in which deterrence is insufficient.95
C. The FTC's Policy Is Very Limited
It is hard to overstate how limited the FTC's policy is on the use
of monetary equitable remedies in traditional antitrust cases. After the
Pitofsky-led Commission had established in court the availability of
the remedy, the Muris-led Commission, as some had predicted,9 6 care-
fully set out a Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in
Competition Cases ("Policy Statement") .7 As the Policy Statement ob-
served, "[I]n the competition area ...the Commission has moved
cautiously and used its monetary remedial authority there spar-
ingly."98 The Commission said that it would seek monetary equitable
relief only in "exceptional" competition cases,99 chosen based on
three factors: (1) "where the underlying violation is clear;" (2) where
there is "a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of a remedial
payment;" and (3) after considering "the value of seeking monetary
relief in light of any other remedies available in the matter, including
private actions and criminal proceedings."' 00 The Commission said
that it would take "pains to ensure that injured persons who recover
losses through private damage actions under the Clayton Act not re-
cover doubly for the same losses via FTC-obtained restitution."101 And,
indeed, the Commission has obtained monetary redress in only a
handful of competition cases102-three in the 2000s (FTC v. Mylan
94. Commission experience, which can be traced back to 1969, is catalogued in
Graubert, supra note 92, at 2-3.
95. One worrisome caveat: The FTC has not yet chosen to file any monetary equitable
relief actions against physicians, even though they may well represent good examples of
the need for greater deterrence. Presumably that will change as the FTC seeks greater
deterrence of physician wrong-doing. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N,
IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DosE OF COMPETITION, A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE 319 (2004) ("The Agencies will carefully consider
whether disgorgement is appropriate in all future cases.").
96. Deborah A. Garza, Is the Past Prologue? A Comparative Analysis of the Clinton Antitrust
Program and Suggestion of Changes to Come, 15 ANTITRUST 64, 68 (2001).





102. For a full list through 2003, see id. at nn.6-8.
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Lab., Inc.,10 3 FTC v. Hearst Trust, 10 4 and FTC v. Perrigo C0.10 5 ). Only this
past fall the Commission filed a complaint against what Chairman
Majoras described as a "naked agreement not to compete and to share
the resulting profits between a branded drug seller and its only pro-
spective generic competitor,"I 06-yet the Commission's complaint
does not request monetary equitable relief. This is not an agency that
is running wild with a new remedy. FTC Commissioner Thomas Leary,
the best-known critic of the FTC's use of monetary equitable relief in
competition cases, has testified that his "original concerns" have been
alleviated by the Commission's Policy Statement and sees no need for
legislative change.10 7
D. The Counter-Arguments Are Unpersuasive
When an agency is acting deliberately, in a restrained fashion, to
use a power it has long enjoyed (and that other agencies enjoy as
well), and that is essential to part of its mission, only a strong showing
can justify tampering with or partially rescinding that power. No such
showing has been made with respect to the Commission's use of sec-
tion 13(b).
It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the only public comment
filed on remedies that addressed section 13(b) supported its contin-
ued use to obtain monetary relief in competition cases. 10 8 Were the
103. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 1:98CV03114 (TFH) (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2001) (order
granting permanent injunction); see FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36-37
(D.D.C. 1999) ($100 million restitution for alleged monopolization), rev'd and reaffld in
pertinent part, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1999).
104. FTC v. Hearst Trust, No.1:01CV00734 (TPJ) (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2001) (consent) ($19
million disgorgement for alleged anticompetitive acquisition and violation of pre-merger
filing requirements).
105. FTC v. Perrigo Co., File No. 021 0197 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004) ($6.25 million dis-
gorgement from two firms for alleged market division; another $1.5 million paid to state
attorneys general). See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Generic Drug Marketers Settle
FTC Charges, (Aug. 12, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/08/per-
rigoalpharma.htm.
106. FTC v. Warner Chilcott Holdings Co. III, Ltd. (D.D.C. filed Nov. 7, 2005); see also
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Sues to Stop Anticompetetive Agreement in U.S.
Drug Industry (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/11/galenbarr.
htm.
107. Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Conm'n: Federal Civil Remedies for Antitrust
Offenses, at 8 n.24 (Dec. 1, 2005) (statement of Thomas B. Leary,) [hereinafter Leary State-
ment], available at http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/Leary-Statement_fi-
nal.pdf.
108. See AAI REMEDIES COMMENT, supra note 49, at 13-14. For all public comments on
remedies, see Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Public Comment: Remedies, http://www.
amc.gov/public.studiesfr28902/remedies.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
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Commission's use of 13(b) a major problem, one would have ex-
pected someone to file a comment complaining about it. When the FTC
invited comments on its use of monetary equitable relief in competi-
tion cases, the American Bar Association Antitrust Section, while re-
serving its judgment on the issue of the ultimate legality of this
remedy, observed that "[d]isgorgement could be justified if the treble
damage recovery or imposition of other penalties were insufficient to
deprive a defendant of his ill-gotten gains."' 09
That invitation of comments did stimulate some objections;' t0 ob-
jections also can be found in Commission opinions, in response to
other Commission programs' 1 in the literature,"12 and in testimony
before the AMC.1 13 Objections raised the following questions:
(a) Is monetary relief necessary?A common argument is that there is
no need for section 13(b) monetary equitable relief.'1 4 Private and
state litigation will provide sufficient deterrence and compensation.
The simple answers are that (i) if action is unnecessary, the F7C can-
and under its policy should-refrain from seeking monetary reme-
109. Letter from Roxane C. Busey, Chair, Section of Antitrust Law, to Donald S. Clark,
Esq., Sec'y to the Fed. Trade Comm'n 8 (Mar. 11, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.
org/antitrust/comments/2002/disgorge.pdf. Although the ABA Antitrust section did not
flatly oppose monetary equitable relief in competition cases, it noted that there would be
"few factual circumstances" where it was needed to deprive a defendant of ill-gotten gains
("for example, if follow-on litigation appeared unlikely because total damages are small").
Id. at 8-9.
110. For indexed comments, see Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Use of Disgorgement As a
Remedy in Competition Cases: Public Comments, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dis-
gorgement/index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
111. See generally Balto, supra note 15; FTC Workshop-Protecting Consumer Interests in
Class Actions, September 13-14, 2004: Workshop Transcript: Class Actions as an Alternative to
Regulation: The Unique Challenges Presented by Multiple Enforcers and Follow-On Lawsuits, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1311 (2005) [hereinafter FTC Workshop].
112. See Areeda, supra note 16.
113. Government Civil Remedies: Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm 'n (2005)
(written testimony of Kevin Arquit) [hereinafter Arquit], available at http://www.amc.gov/
commissionhearings/pdf/StatementArquit.pdf; see also Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n, supra note 46 (remarks of Kevin Arquit).
114. See Arquit, supra note 113, at 2 ("[P] ublic and private enforcement mesh together
to form a complete enforcement scheme that provides deterrence and compensates vic-
tims."); Balto, supra note 15, at 1122 ("First, it is not necessary to compensate consumers
for anticompetitive harm because there are usually private direct and indirect purchaser
actions pending at the time the agency enters its consent decrees."); Kenneth G. Starling,
CriminalAntitrust Enforcement, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 157, 158 (1988) ("[I]f there were unrecov-
ered overcharges in such matters, private plaintiffs or state attorneys general would have
pursued them already, or will pursue them in the future, if there is sufficient incentive.");
Letter from Kenneth G. Starling to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Feb. 6,
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/disgorgement/starling.pdf (submit-
ted to the FTC as comment on disgogement).
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dies, and (ii) logic suggests and experience with physician price coor-
dination proves that this additional remedy is needed.1 15
(b) Will monetary relief result in duplicative recoveries? Several com-
mentators worry that the FTC's use of section 13(b) will result in du-
plicative recoveries. 116 One answer is that the FTC policy expressly
states that the Commission "is sensitive to the interest in avoiding du-
plicative recoveries by injured persons or 'excessive' multiple pay-
ments by defendants for the same injury," and the policy bars double
recovery for injuries' 17-apparently notwithstanding the antitrust
laws' prescription of treble damages. Another answer is that in practice,
the Commission has proven its sensitivity to this issue by how it has
structured its 13(b) settlements.
At least three issues relating to multiple recoveries remain un-
resolved. First, would private recovery of single damages prevent the
FTC from awarding money through section 13(b)? The FTC policy
suggests that it would, at least if it achieved sufficiently substantial dis-
gorgement. Second, would a direct purchaser's private recovery pre-
vent the FTC from awarding money to an indirect purchaser? Here,
the FTC statement promises sensitivity but not an absolute bar, and
rightly so. So long as a defendant has not finished disgorging ill-got-
ten gains, there is no reason not to make injured individuals whole.118
115. Another example of a government injunctive order not followed by private litiga-
tion is provided by United States v. Mathworks, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4622 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 6, 2003) (final judgment entered), in which a consent judgment resolving a com-
plaint alleging per se illegality was not followed by any private suit alleging injury from an
antitrust violation. E-mail from Richard Rosen, Partner, Arnold & Porter, to Stephen Cal-
kins, Professor, Wayne State Univ. Law Sch. (Dec. 29, 2005). It also appears that no money
was paid in private damages following United States v. Village Voice Media, LLC, 68 Fed. Reg.
7132 (Feb. 12, 2003) (proposed final judgment and competitive impact statement). An
action by former employees was dismissed for want of standing. Shaker v. Village Voice
Media, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10343 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2005). Neither that opinion
nor any other reported opinion refers to any successful private action. AJuly 2004 report
indicated that class action status was being sought, Lawyers & Settlements, Law Suits Filed,
Village Voice, Media http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/case/villagevoice (last visited
Mar. 23, 2006), but the referenced lawyer's web site, Scott Meyer, Home Page, http://www.
myerlawfirm.com/scottmyer.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006), contains no mention of any
such lawsuit.
116. See Arquit, supra note 113, at 4-5; Balto, supra note 15, at 1123 ("First, the use of
Section 13(b) poses a significant risk of duplicative recovery."); Johnson, supra note 48, at
1027-30; FTC Workshop, supra note 111, at 1315 (remarks of Kenneth Gallo) ("I think
there's at least the potential for serious duplicative recovery in antitrust cases . .. ."). Mr.
Gallo quite properly disclosed that he had worked on one of the recent disgorgement
cases.
117. FTC Policy Statement, supra note 8, at 90.
118. Some commentators view Illinois Brick as a an important policy decision to keep
federal compensation away from indirect purchasers. Cf., e.g., FTC Workshop, supra note
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Third, what if the FTC distribution occurs first, and a year later a pri-
vate cause of action is filed? Does this "create enormous logistical
problems to be sure that the same consumers aren't getting redress
twice and that the defendant isn't paying twice[?]"119 But this has
never happened, 120 and the chance of it happening is remote, given
incentives for prompt filing of private claims, normal delay in FTC
actions, and statutes of limitations. Nor, in a system of penalties in
which treble damages is the theoretical norm, should the prospect of a
possible rare award of double damages be horrifying. This implausible
hypothetical is no reason to object to an otherwise desirable remedy.
(c) Isn't this all too complicated? Another theme is the plea for rela-
tive simplicity, or, at least, the suggestion that monetary equitable re-
lief would unreasonably complicate already complicated proceedings.
But the FTC's participation can simplify proceedings by facilitating a
national settlement.' 21 And where there otherwise would be no recov-
ery and no disgorgement of wrongfully held gains, some additional
procedural steps are worth taking.
(d) Even if the policy is sound in theory, can it work in practice? Proof
of what would have happened had a different road been taken is ex-
ceedingly difficult. Commentator Gallo noted the reasonableness of
the FTC's policies but added that his "problem" is that "I don't think
it's actually worked out that way." 122 Critics point especially to the
Hearst Trust case, in which the Commission challenged what it said was
a merger to monopoly through violation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino pre-
111, at 1317 (comments of Kenneth Gallo). The legal and policy issues are well debated by
the dueling statements in Mylan. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Reaches Re-
cord Financial Settlement to Settle Charges of Price-Fixing in Generic Drug Market (Nov.
29, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/11/mylanfin.htm. The heart of Illi-
nois Brick is not about protecting defendants, but rather about avoiding undue complexity.
See Stephen Calkins, Illinois Brick and Its Legislative Aftermath, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 967, 970
(1978). Where a relatively straightforward disgorgement action is necessary to deprive a
wrong-doer of ill-gotten gains, the fact that indirect purchasers will benefit from this is no
reason not to proceed (although the set-off implications are more tricky, see Health Care and
Competition, Law and Policy: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm'n & the Dep't of Justice, 22
(2003) [hereinafter Orlans Remarks] (remarks of Melvin H. Orlans)). As a practical mat-
ter, of course, total payments have rarely if ever surpassed government estimates of single
damages.
119. FTC Workshop, supra note 111, at 1317 (comments of Kenneth Gallo).
120. Id. at 1316-17.
121. See O'Connor, supra note 93.
122. FTC Workshop, supra note 111, at 1316 (comments of Kenneth Gallo); see also Ar-
quit, supra note 113, at 8 ("Indeed, the examples cited in the Policy Statement ... undermine
the Commission's arguments that it can identify situations in which its monetary remedies
can usefully add to private action.").
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merger notification program. 123 The premerger notification allega-
tion was resolved by payment of $4 million in civil penalties.1 24 The
monopolization allegation was resolved by divestiture and disgorge-
ment of $19 million. 125 Although Commissioners Anthony and
Thompson wrote that without disgorgement, the asset divestiture
alone "might have allowed Hearst to profit from its unlawful behav-
ior,"126 Commissioner Leary described the case as "a classic example
of a situation where the remedy is unnecessary, if not affirmatively
harmful."127 He explained that the $19 million would be turned over
to the plaintiffs' counsel who filed actions shortly after the Commis-
sion filed its case and included in the total settlement of $26 million.
He speculated that without disgorgement, the Commission might well
have won a larger civil penalty, which is not offset against the private
damages, such that the effect of the Commission's seeking disgorge-
ment could well be "that the parties will wind up paying less money"
in combined penalties/disgorgement/damages. 128 Another conse-
quence of the FTC obtaining disgorgement was that the direct plain-
tiffs' attorneys fees were limited to thirty percent of the incremental
amount attributable to their efforts, which the court computed as $8
million, yielding a fee of only $2.4 million.1 29
123. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Charges Hearst Trust with Acquiring Mo-
nopoly in Vital Drug Information Market (Apr. 4, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2001/04/hearst.htm.
124. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Hearst Corporation Settles Charges of
Filing Incomplete Pre-merger Report (Oct. 11, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2001/10/hearst.htm.
125. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Hearst Corp. to Disgorge $19 Million and
Divest Business to Facts and Comparisons to Settle FTC Complaint (Dec. 14, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/12/hearst.htm.
126. Statement of Comm'rs Sheila F. Anthony & Mozelle W. Thompson, The Hearst
Trust et al., File No. 991-0323 (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/
12/anthstate.htm.
127. Statement of Comm'r Thomas B. Leary, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in
Part, Federal Trade Comm'n v. The Hearst Trust, File No. 991-0323 (Dec. 14, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/12/learystate.htm; see also FTC Workshop, supra note 111,
at 1316 (comments of Kenneth Gallo).
128. Id. Commissioner Leary was suitably cautious about this suggestion, noting that
"hypothetical predictions about the 'but for' world are always risky." Id.; see also Statement
of Comm'r Orson Swindle, Concurring, Federal Trade Comm'n v. The Hearst Trust, File
No. 991-0323 (Dec. 14, 2001) ("One thing seems clear: because the Commission's $19
million in disgorgement will be subtracted from the at least $26 million obtained against
defendants by class action plaintiffs, the Commission's months-long pursuit of disgorge-
ment has yielded a monetary recovery that adds no real value to the private remedy.").
129. In re First Databank Antitrust Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 96, 101 (D.D.C. 2002). The
FTC intervened to object to the attorneys' fee being based on an amount that included the
disgorgement obtained by the Commission. Id. at 98.
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The reality is that the counterfactual is very hard to prove. When
the Commission filed its Hearst Trust lawsuit, no private class actions
were pending, and the Commission believed that absent a disgorge-
ment action, defendants "would be likely to retain their ill-gotten
gains."130 This seems a reasonable belief, since the alternative-an ad-
ministrative challenge to a merger-rarely stimulates follow-on litiga-
tion,131 and the Commission's other basis for a challenge (violation of
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act) does not create a private cause of ac-
tion.1 32 Of course, shortly after the Commission filed its disgorgement
action multiple class actions were filed, but that proves little about what
would have happened had the Commission taken the alternative
course; it is much easier for private litigants to share in disgorged
profits than, for instance, to prove that a merger is unlawful and
caused them antitrust injury.133 It is thus entirely possible, and per-
haps even likely, that disgorgement occurred only because of the
FTC's lawsuit.134
130. Orlans Remarks, supra note 118, at 19; see also Statement of Chairman Pitofsky &
Comm'rs Sheila F. Anthony & Mozelle W. Thompson, First Databank (Apr. 4, 2001) ("The
alternative [to a disgorgement action], which would simply restore competition by divest-
ing illegally acquired assets, is inadequate because it allows the respondent to walk off with
profits gained as a result of its allegedly illegal behavior."). But cf Dissenting Statement of
Comm'rs Orson Swindle & Thomas B. Leary, Hearst Trust and Hearst Corporation's Ac-
quisition of J.B. Laughrey, Inc. (Apr. 4, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/
04/hearstdisswinleary.htm ("Without expressing a view on whether that extraordinary rem-
edy should ever be available in an antitrust case, we believe that, if a violation is proved,
existing private remedies are adequate to ensure that respondents do not benefit from any
possible wrongdoing and that their customers can be made whole.").
131. For instance, I believe that no follow-on lawsuits have been filed in In re Evanston
Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2005 WL 2845790 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 2005).
132. See Orlans Remarks, supra note 118, at 19-20.
133. Clayton Act section 5 specifically provides that "in any action of proceeding
brought under the antitrust laws, collateral estoppel effect shall not be given to any finding
made by the Federal Trade Commission . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000). Nor are FTC
decisions prima facie evidence in private antitrust suits. Id.
134. One could ask a different question: not whether there would have been disgorge-
ment without FTC action, but whether the FTC, having stimulated private lawsuits by suing
for disgorgement, should then settle what it considered a meritorious case without ob-
taining disgorgement (reasoning that it's mission had been accomplished). By the time the
FTC filed its case, however, its work was almost completed. It had conducted "an exhaus-
tive 20-month investigation" costing more than 25,000 hours. In re First Databank Antitrust
Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 96, 97 (D.D.C. 2002). Less than a week later, defendants offered to
settle the case by disgorging $16 million. Id. Little would have been gained by the FTC
abandoning disgorgement at that point, and much could have been lost were the FTC,
having done all the work, to have left resolution of the dispute to private lawyers who
might or might not act in the public interest-and were the FTC to create a precedent that
would make suspect the bonafides of the next disgorgement case it filed.
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Commentators also have complained about the FTC's Mylan case.
It has been pointed out that by the time the FTC settled that case,
multiple private and state cases were pending, and the money ob-
tained by the FTC went into a fund administered by the states.' 35 But
once again, when the Commission decided how to proceed, no private
actions were pending. 3 6 The Commission doubted that full disgorge-
ment was likely absent its action, because the direct purchasers were
large drug wholesalers who might be reluctant to sue the pharmaceu-
tical companies with whom they regularly dealt, especially where the
wholesalers had largely passed on any price increase or even benefited
from a price increase when the percentage fee yielded more generous
payments.'3 7 Also, as in Hearst Trust, the Commission's lawsuit stimu-
lated private litigation-but, once again, that consequence does not
prove what would have happened had the Commission not sought
disgorgement.13 8
(e) Will monetary equitable relief lure the FTC away from its special mis-
sion? In his eloquent dissent in Mylan, Commissioner Leary warned
that this kind of use of section 13(b) was "almost too expedient and,
dare I say, too seductive. It transforms the Commission into a prosecu-
135. See Balto, supra note 15, at 1120-21, 1124; FTC Workshop, supra note 111, at 1317
(comments of Kenneth Gallo). Commissioner Leary dissented from the Commission's ac-
cepting of disgorgement in Mylan not because the remedy made no difference but rather
because he had fundamental objections to the Commission's use of section 13(b) in these
cases. See Statement of Comm'r Thomas B. Leary, Dissenting in Part and Concurring in
Part, Federal Trade Commission v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al., FTC File No.
X990015 (Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/11/mylanlearystat-
ment.htm.
136. Orlans Remarks, supra note 118, at 17.
137. Id.; see also More Than Law Enforcement: The FTC's Many Tools-A Conversation with
Tim Muris and Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 836 (2005) (comments of Robert Pitof-
sky) ("A simple cease-and-desist order would not have affected Mylan's profits [more than
$120 million in wrongfully additional profits a year], and consumers who paid monopoly
prices to pharmacies for the drugs-often elderly consumers on fixed incomes--did not
purchase directly from Mylan and probably were not entitled to damages under federal
law.").
138. Orlans Remarks, supra note 118, at 18-19. ("Notably, the direct purchaser class
action settled quite late and I think fairly cheaply, and that was because as the Commission
had originally envisioned, many of the drug wholesalers opted of that class action."). When
it issued the complaint in Mylan, the Commission announced that it was seeking at least
$120 million in disgorgement or restitution. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Mylan,
Nation's Second Largest Generic Drug Maker, Charged with Restraint of Trade, Conspir-




tor with an immensely powerful antitrust weapon."' 39 This is not the
mission of the FTC, he argued: "Our traditional role in competition
matters has been to look forward rather than backward, to articulate
the law where the law is uncertain, and to seek relief that is prospec-
tive and remedial rather than retrospective and punitive. ' 140
This is a legitimate concern. The FTC does have a special role to
play.'4 1 The FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection has become some-
thing of a lean, mean, court-litigating machine, but at the very real
cost of largely depriving consumer protection of any adjudicative con-
tributions from the Commissioners. 142 Were the Commission to be-
come merely a filer of federal court complaints, the talents of existing
Commissioners would be wasted and the chance of attracting talented
successors reduced.
Although the concern is thus legitimate, it is hard to see how a
disgorgement case every couple of years poses a serious threat to the
Commission's mission. Yes, as Commissioner Leary noted, these ac-
tions can be "seductive," and, yes, it is important not to be seduced, or
at least not too often. The evidence thus far suggests that the Commis-
sion is fully capable of exercising restraint.
HI. Serious Consideration Should Be Given to Making
Monetary Relief an Option for Selected Civil
Antitrust Division Cases
Many of the same reasons why it makes sense for the FTC to be
able to obtain monetary redress for selected antitrust violations coun-
sel in favor of establishing a program through which monetary relief
would be an option for selected DOJ Antitrust Division cases. As Assis-
tant Attorney General Pate observed, civil fines could supply impor-
tant additional deterrence while also aligning the United States system
of remedies more closely with foreign legal systems. 143 At present, at
least in practice, antitrust violations are of varying severity, but the
139. Statement of Comm'r Thomas B. Leary, Dissenting in Part and Concurring in
Part, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Mylan Pharms., Inc. et al., FTC File No. X990015 (Nov. 29,
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/11/mylanlearystatment.htm.
140. Id. David Balto also has vigorously stressed the same "special mission" theme.
Balto, supra note 15, at 1123.
141. This is one the themes of the second Kirkpatrick Report. See Kirkpatrick et al.,
supra note 87.
142. The Commission's recent opinion in Telebrands Corp., No. 9313, 2005 WL 2395790
(Sept. 19, 2005 F.T.C.), was its first consumer protection opinion in more than five years.
143. See Pate, supra note 18, at 2 (endorsing study of possible civil fines and accompany-
ing "adjustments to private damages remedies").
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Antitrust Division is limited to choosing between indictments and in-
junctive relief. This disconnect could be addressed most neatly
through legislation creating civil fines or penalties for antitrust viola-
tions, 144 but alternative solutions also exist.
The problem should not be overstated. The private bar usually
can be counted on to follow government actions with lawsuits seeking
treble damages. The states also can obtain monetary relief-indeed, it
is not uncommon for a federal injunctive consent to be announced
concurrently with a state consent requiring payments, 145 and for pur-
poses of deterrence and compensation, it does not matter whether the
conduit is federal or state. As this Article has reviewed at length, more-
over, the FIC can obtain monetary equitable relief, and nothing save
pride of place would prevent the Justice Department from referring to
the FTC an antitrust investigation in which such relief would be espe-
cially appropriate.
One other way that additional deterrence could be achieved
would be for the Antitrust Division to seek to establish its right to ob-
tain equitable reliefjust as the FTC does. The Justice Department ap-
pears to have taken the position, in the context of litigating
disgorgement under RICO, that the Sherman Act's empowering of
district courts "to prevent and restrain violations" of the Act autho-
rizes the courts to award disgorgement to the government.1 46 Others
144. Any such legislation should authorize the penalties to be sought by either antitrust
agency. The FTC currently brings many civil penalty cases, Antitrust Law Developments
(Fifth), supra note 11, at 662-65, and there is no reason to create a civil remedy for one
agency but not the other.
145. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Requires Hospi-
tals to Enter into Enforcement Order to Remedy Consent Decree Violations (July 12,
2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressyreleases/2000/5147.htm (con-
sent order requires defendants to pay $300,000 civil penalty and $200,000 costs to Florida).
In United States v. Village Voice Media, LLC, advertisers were given the opportunity to renego-
tiate contracts, and such money as was disgorged went to the states, with California receiv-
ing $610,000 in civil penalties and $140,000 in attorney's fees and costs. California Settles
Antitrust Litigation Against Alternative Weeklies Publishers, 84 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 90 (Jan. 31, 2003). The parties also paid $20,000 in attorneys fees and $45,000
in "civil forfeitures" to Ohio. See Press Release, Ohio Attorney Gen., Alternative Papers
Agree to End Illegal Market Practices; Village Voice Media and NT Media Settle with Attor-
neys General (Jan. 27, 2003), available at http://www.ag.state.oh.us/press/03/01/press-
release_20030127_3.asp.
146. Reply Brief for the United States on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4 & n.3,
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 478 (2005) (No. 05-92) (citing United
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dis-
senting)) (certiorari was denied). Almost fifty years ago, the Justice Department sought
without success to persuade an antitrust court to rely on its general equitable powers to
benefit what it saw as a wronged third party. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 373,
399 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), vacated and remanded, 371 U.S. 38 (1962) ("Nowhere in the statute,
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agree. 147 Depending on how litigation of related issues progresses
through the courts, the Antitrust Division might decide to act on this
view.
The cleanest way to help the Division address these mid-situation
cases would be for Congress to authorize the Division and the FTC to
seek civil fines or penalties in antitrust cases. Fines and penalties have
the benefit of helping to deter illegal conduct that does not result in
gains suitable for disgorgement (for instance, because the wrongdo-
ing is stopped at an early stage). Another benefit of a system of civil
fines or penalties is that it would keep the Antitrust Division firmly in
the business of challenging civil antitrust violations.148
Formal authorization of fines or penalties would not be without
some risk. There is always some chance of abuse, especially if the mon-
eys could be seen as aiding in supporting an agency's budget requests.
Beyond that, civil fines or penalties could be viewed as another issue
over which to bargain as part of settlement. If defendants came to
believe they could avoid indictment (especially of individuals) by of-
fering to pay large sums civilly, or if government lawyers were ever
persuaded to listen favorably to such an argument, great harm could
be done to the Division's criminal enforcement program, which is uni-
versally regarded as its crown jewel.
Were the antitrust agencies authorized to impose civil fines or
penalties for antitrust violations, coordination with private damages
actions would be necessary. Even if general antitrust deterrence is too
low, there is no reason why a few unlucky defendants should be sin-
gled out potentially to pay a civil fine plus treble damages (or perhaps
more, to different classes of purchasers). If overall damages and pen-
alties are too low, increase them. Although compensation of victims is
a virtue, the principal point of creating civil fine or penalty authority
should be to make sure that wrongdoers identified by the antitrust
agencies part with sufficient funds so that others will be deterred. It
however, is there any authority to require a defendant in a government antitrust case to
refund that which it has received, even under an illegal contract, and to pay that amount to
a private party not a party to the action.") (DOJ successfully objected on other grounds to
inadequacy of remedy).
147. See Leary Statement, supra note 107, at 7 ("It is reasonable to assume that the DOJ
could get similar [monetary equitable] relief, under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 4, and Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25...."). Of course, critics of the
FTC's monetary equitable relief program likely would argue that the Division similarly
lacks authority.
148. Although some might favor letting the FTC specialize in non-criminal antitrust, I
prefer to have both agencies address a spectrum of conduct.
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makes no difference, for purposes of deterrence, whether money is
paid to the government or to a private claimant.149
Nothing would prevent Congress from authorizing a fine and
specifying that the moneys be made available for injured persons. An
example of this can be found in the SEC's new "fair fund" authority,
which provides that civil penalties may be added to disgorgement
funds to aid victims. 150 Presumably, a civil penalty could be held in
escrow for a period of time and refunded to the extent that equal
amounts are paid out in damages. It makes sense to favor payments to
victims over payments to the general treasury, both as a matter of eq-
uity and as an incentive to inform the government about violations.
More generally, it makes sense to work towards achieving better
remedies for that middle class of cases brought by the Antitrust Divi-
sion. This could be accomplished though legislation, and there is a
substantial argument to pursuing this course. Given the inevitable
risks any time Congress acts, however, and given the uncertain results
of creating a formal program of fines and penalties, it might be more
prudent for the Division to work on using the authority already availa-
ble to it-by working with states that can extract payments, by refer-
ring cases to the FTC, and perhaps by seeking to use its own inherent
equitable authority.
149. One group of commentators, while recognizing the important role of the govern-
ment antitrust agencies, opposed civil fines out of fear that "displacement of private reme-
dies would reduce enforcement of the antitrust laws, and should be disfavored." AAI
REMEDIES COMMENT, supra note 49, at 13. Yet displacement of $X of damages by an equal
amount of penalties would leave deterrence unchanged. Deterrence would be reduced
only were total resources available to fund private "attorneys general" to fall below some
critical level needed to preserve effective private litigators, which seems unlikely; or if a
particular case saw just enough displacement as to make it no longer worth pursuing pri-
vately, which could not happen very often; or if the displacement was keyed to single dam-
ages, such that a $10 million civil penalty displaced not $10 million in damages, but $30
million. Given the paucity of government civil antitrust litigation, see Calkins, supra note 4,
at 156, no effect would seem very large; but, in any event, the largest effect could be pre-
vented simply by keying any displacement to the amount of actual paid damages foregone.
And the problem could be prevented in its entirety simply by having the fines made paya-
ble only to the extent that damages are not.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2000); see Douglas A. Henry, Comment, Subordinating Subordina-
tion: Worldcom and the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley's Fair Funds Provision on Distributions in Bank-
ruptcy, 21 BANKR. DEV. J. 259 (2004). The SEC is very thoughtfully addressing the
computation and allocation of penalties, thereby providing a good example for the anti-
trust community. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities
and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, Release 2006-4 (Jan. 4, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
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Conclusion
The most important conclusion is the most obvious: the FT7C is
proceeding responsibly to use its monetary equitable relief authority,
and this is no time for Congress to get involved. The rapid pace of
judicial developments with respect to other monetary equitable relief
issues provides further reason for Congress's taking no action at this
time.
Whether Congress should consider creating civil fines is a harder
question. The bottom line, however, is that the current system of "bi-
modal penalties" makes little sense and imposes modest but real costs.
Serious consideration should be given to addressing it-at least by the
Division using authority currently available and perhaps by Congress
considering adopting antitrust civil fines and penalties enforceable by
the DOJ's Antitrust Division and the FTC.
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